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CAN ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT  
OF ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AUGMENT EXISTING 
REGULATIONS?* 
 
Abstract 
 
Encouraging firms to voluntarily develop environmental management systems 
(EMSs) has been described as a potential policy tool for achieving environmental 
objectives in Georgia. We survey current thinking on the subject and note several 
shortcomings in current methods used to evaluate what motivates private firms to adopt 
comprehensive EMSs. Using a unique dataset of environmental management practices 
of Japanese manufacturers, we find that consumer pressures, regulatory pressures, and 
market power are major factors that motivate firms to develop comprehensive EMSs. 
We also find that after controlling for self-selection bias in survey response, the effects 
of regulatory pressures become more significant and larger in magnitude. These results 
suggest that although encouraging development of EMSs has the potential to augment 
existing regulations, the regulatory tools are fundamental to the success of such 
voluntary approaches. 
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CAN ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AUGMENT EXISTING 
REGULATIONS?* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Voluntary approaches to environmental protection are sometimes called the “next 
generation of environmental policies” (Esty and Chertow 1997). In contrast to 
traditional mandatory policies such as direct regulations, these approaches rely on 
voluntary actions of firms to improve their environmental performances. Examples 
include unilateral commitments by firms, public programs in which the government 
encourages firms to voluntarily achieve specified goals, and information disclosure 
strategies such as environmental labeling. The establishment of an environmental 
management system is one form of voluntary approaches. An environmental 
management system (EMS) is a principal means available to firms by which 
environmental concerns can be integrated into corporate decision-making. It involves 
organizational changes in management systems, such as introducing environmental staff 
and directors, setting environmental objectives, and establishing monitoring and audit 
systems. 
Actively encouraging firms to voluntarily develop EMSs through offers of technical 
assistance, public recognition, and other benefits has recently been described as a 
potential policy tool for achieving environmental objectives in Georgia.  For example, 
Georgia’s Department of Natural Resources’ Pollution Prevention Assistance Division 
(P2AD) wishes to encourage private firms in Georgia to adopt EMSs, which are 
assumed to lead to reduced pollution emissions to surface water, groundwater and air.  
Georgia is not alone in attempting to encourage firms to voluntarily improve their 
environmental performance through the adoption of EMSs: such initiatives are common 
throughout OECD nations (OECD 2003; Rondinelli 2001; U.S. EPA 2004; Khanna 
2001; Alberini and Segerson 2002).  
Before promoting and relying on firms’ voluntary development of EMSs, however, 
the potential of EMSs must be critically evaluated. Despite growing popularity of EMSs 
among firms, there are significant variations across firms in the comprehensiveness of 
their EMSs. Without accurate information on the factors that motivate firms to develop 
EMSs on their own, regulators will be unlikely to design and target incentives in a way 
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that leads to a net increase in the use of EMSs. 
Although there are increasing numbers of informal analyses and anecdotal evidence 
of the factors that motivate firms to develop EMSs, formal econometric analyses are 
still relatively scant (Lyon and Maxwell 2004). Past studies include Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996), who investigated the factors that motivate Canadian firms to adopt a 
single environmental plan.  The adoption decision of ISO 14001 was investigated by 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) for Mexican firms, and by Nakamura et al. (2001) and Welch et 
al. (2002) for Japanese firms. Khanna and Anton (2002) and Anton et al. (2004) 
investigated the factors that motivate U.S. firms to adopt various environmental 
management practices. These studies tend to agree on the importance of pressures from 
shareholders and governments, but there is mixed evidence on the effects of consumers, 
industry structure, and financial status of firms (Lyon and Maxwell 2004). 
Our study adds new empirical evidence on the factors that motivate firms to 
develop EMSs and extends previous research in two important ways. First, we examine 
the factors that determine the comprehensiveness of a firm’s EMS, rather than the 
adoption of a single environmental practice. With the exception of Khanna and Anton 
(2002), studies of EMSs have focused on a single aspect of environmental management 
practices or systems.1 Successful environmental improvement, however, requires a 
systematic and integrated effort of planning, implementation, and monitoring (Denton 
1994). Thus, it is informative to investigate the determinants of variations in the 
comprehensiveness of EMSs rather than the adoption decision of a single 
environmental practice. We draw on a unique dataset from a survey that examined 
environmental management practices of Japanese manufacturing firms and analyze the 
determinants of comprehensiveness of EMSs. 
Second, our study is the first that controls for self-selection in econometric 
estimation. The existing studies (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Dasgupta et al. 2000; 
Nakamura et al. 2001; Welch et al. 2002; Khanna and Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004) 
used firm-level survey data on environmental practices, but none of them controlled for 
self-selection in survey responses. Firms with poorly developed EMSs may be less 
                                                  
1 Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyzed the determinants of each of the four different environmental 
practices separately and did not study the determinants jointly. Anton et al. (2004) used the same 
dataset as Khanna and Anton (2002). 
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likely to respond to the survey because responding to the survey may reveal their poor 
performances and may lead to bad publicity.  Estimation procedures that ignore this 
self-selection may result in biased estimates. Although self-selection by non-response is 
always an issue in surveys, it is typically difficult to control for it because of the 
absence of requisite data. We take advantage of the characteristics of our dataset and 
econometrically control for non-response bias. 
In addition to the above contributions, our regression analysis tests influences of 
parent companies, which were not previously studied but nonetheless we believe are 
important in explaining firms’ motivations to develop EMSs. 
After the regression analysis, we examine how comprehensiveness of firms’ EMSs 
changes when firm characteristics are changed. Such information is critical in 
evaluating the potential of future incentive programs that encourage firms to develop 
more comprehensive EMSs. If incentive programs are going to be effective, they must 
be able to create sufficiently large changes in firms’ comprehensiveness of EMSs with 
appropriate incentives. Furthermore, such information makes it possible to compare and 
analyze the effectiveness of various forms of incentives in inducing firms to develop 
more comprehensive EMSs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses on 
the factors that determine the comprehensiveness of a firm’s EMS and defines the 
variables that are used to test the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical 
methods. Section 4 presents the results and discusses policy implications. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. HYPOTHESES AND MEASURES 
2.1. Hypotheses 
The past theoretical studies on voluntary over compliance assume that firms’ voluntary 
actions are based on their profit-maximizing behaviors (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995; 
Segerson and Miceli 1998; Maxwell et al. 2000; Lutz et al. 2000). Under this 
assumption, profit-maximizing firms develop EMSs as long as expected benefits exceed 
expected costs. Expected benefits may include reduced risk of liabilities, competitive 
advantages in green markets, increased efficiency in input use, and improved investor 
relations. Expected costs may include training of personnel, investment in new 
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machines and technologies, and hiring consulting assistance (U.S. EPA and NSF 
International 2000). 
We hypothesize that the following five factors affect expected benefits and costs, 
and therefore explain why firms develop EMSs: stakeholder pressures, regulatory 
pressures, ability, parent company’s influence, and market conditions. We explain the 
rationale for these factors below and then, in Section 2.2, we describe how we will 
measure these factors. 
(1) Stakeholder pressures  
Stakeholder pressures include pressures from consumers and shareholders. Numerous 
surveys have shown that consumers make decisions with an awareness of their 
environmental impacts. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) argued that consumers can 
create pressures on firms to be environmentally-friendly because such firms can 
command a price premium in the product market by differentiating themselves from 
other firms.  Empirically, consumer pressures were found to be important in motivating 
the adoption of an environmental plan in Canada (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996) and 
environmental practices in the U.S. (Khanna and Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004), but 
were found to explain only some aspects of ISO 14001 adoption among Japanese firms 
(Nakamura et al. 2001). In this study, we hypothesize that firms in closer contact with 
consumers develop more comprehensive EMSs. 
Shareholders can also create pressures. The efficient market hypothesis predicts 
that a firm’s current stock price reflects investors’ beliefs about the firm’s future 
profitability. If investors believe that the absence of a well-developed EMS implies 
lower future profits for a firm, they will bid down the stock price, which would put 
pressures on the firm to develop an EMS (Hamilton 1995). The absence of a well-
developed EMS may imply lower future profits because investors may believe it 
reflects, among other things, potential liabilities and inefficiency in input use. 
Individual investors may also have preferences for environmentally-friendly firms. 
Such preferences are behind the increasing popularity of socially responsible 
investment funds, including Japan’s “eco-fund” (Tsukushi 2000). Moreover, foreign 
shareholders, especially those in Europe and North America, may have stronger 
preferences for environmentally-friendly firms or may be more likely than the average 
 4
 
 
 
Japanese investor to avoid potential environmental risks associated with the absence of 
a well-developed EMS. We hypothesize that firms that receive stronger domestic and 
foreign shareholder pressures develop more comprehensive EMSs. Empirically, both 
Khanna and Anton (2002) and Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) found that shareholders 
are important in motivating firms to take proactive actions, but neither study explicitly 
separated domestic shareholders and foreign shareholders. 
(2) Regulatory pressures  
Past studies found regulatory pressures to be an important driver for voluntary adoption 
of environmental practices. Perceived regulatory pressures were found to motivate 
firms to adopt ISO 14001 (Nakamura et al. 2001) and an environmental plan (Henriques 
and Sadorsky 1996). Existing and anticipated regulatory pressures were also found to 
be important (Khanna and Anton 2002). Firms under stronger regulatory pressures are 
likely to have higher compliance costs and a greater potential for government sanctions. 
Therefore, these firms may develop EMSs to reduce current and anticipated costs 
associated with regulatory pressures. Alternatively, firms may develop EMSs for 
strategic reasons.  Several theoretical studies have postulated that firms employ 
unilateral initiatives to preempt future regulatory threats (Segerson and Miceli 1998; 
Maxwell et al. 2000) or to weaken forthcoming new regulations (Lutz et al. 2000).  
Firms may also receive pressures from foreign governments. For example, firms 
that export may need to satisfy more stringent environmental requirements by foreign 
governments and are thus likely to develop higher quality EMSs. There is anecdotal 
evidence that Japanese firms take environmental actions to penetrate EU and North 
American markets (for example, see Roht-Arriaza 1997).  Regardless of the source of 
regulatory pressure, we hypothesize that firms under stronger regulatory pressures 
develop more comprehensive EMSs. 
(3) Ability  
Ability measures the ease with which firms can make organizational changes to develop 
EMSs. Ability includes technical ability and financial ability. Technical ability is likely 
to be important because, unlike traditional regulations that typically impose specific 
technologies, EMSs provide firms with the flexibility to develop their own management 
practices that internalize environmental concerns (Coglianese and Nash 2001). Firms 
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with a higher stock of technical knowledge may thus have a higher ability to develop 
innovative management practices. Empirically, Khanna and Anton (2002) found that 
R&D expenditures are important factors in firm adoption of environmental practices in 
the United States. 
Financial ability is important because establishing an EMS imposes substantial 
costs on firms. For example, implementation of ISO 14001 takes approximately six 
months to two years, depending on the existing internal environmental practices of the 
firm (ISO Information Center 1996). Substantial start-up costs are also required for 
consulting, training of personnel, and capital investment. Therefore, financially 
healthier firms are more likely to have the ability to develop EMSs. Empirical evidence 
of the impact of financial health is mixed. While Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) found 
no evidence, Nakamura et al. (2001) found that a higher debt ratio has a significantly 
negative impact on ISO 14001 adoption. 
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that firms with higher technical and 
financial abilities develop more comprehensive EMSs. 
(4) Parent company’s influence 
A firm’s management and operations can be influenced by a parent company that owns 
a substantial amount of the firm’s voting stock. The decision to develop an EMS is thus 
also likely to be influenced by the parent company. The parent company may believe 
that its reputation is affected by the environmental performances of its subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, the subsidiary firms may find it easier to develop EMSs because they may 
be able to use the experience and technical knowledge of the parent company. Thus, we 
hypothesize that if a firm has a parent company that has a highly developed EMS, the 
subsidiary firm will also have a highly developed EMS.  No previous studies have 
empirically tested this hypothesis. 
(5) Market conditions  
Spence (1984) argued that product development is often a cost-reducing innovation that 
provides more services to the customers with the same price or lower price. According 
to this view, an EMS can be thought of as an innovation that delivers more 
environmental services. There is a huge debate on how market conditions affect 
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innovation in the research and development literature. The debate dates back to 
Schumpeter (1942), who argued that monopolistic market conditions (greater market 
power and concentrated market structure) favor innovation. According to his claim, 
monopolistic conditions generate internal financial resources necessary to cover 
investment expenditures on innovation. Thus, we hypothesize that firms with greater 
market power develop more comprehensive EMSs. Schumpeter also argued that a more 
concentrated market structure reduces uncertainty associated with rival behavior and 
favors innovation (Schumpeter 1942; Cohen and Levin 1989). Despite the large amount 
of empirical studies on the effect of market concentration on innovation, the results of 
these studies are not robust (Cohen and Levin 1989). In this paper, the impact of 
concentration of market on EMSs is left as an empirical issue. 
2.2. Measures and definitions 
The following variables are used to represent the factors that are hypothesized to affect 
the development of EMSs: advertising expenditures, capital intensity, foreign 
ownership, pollution intensity, export ratio, current debt ratio, age of assets, R&D 
expenditures, parent company’s quality of EMSs, market share, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. The list of variables and their definitions are summarized in table 1.   
Table 1:  List of Variables and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Advertising expenditures (billion yen) Annual expenditures on advertisement 
Capital intensity Fixed assets divided by number of employee 
Foreign ownership (%) Percentage of shares owned by foreign investors 
Heavily-polluting industries = 1 if firms are in the industries with large average 
    emission of chemicals per firm; = 0 otherwise 
Intermediate-polluting industries = 1 if firms are in the industries with intermediate 
    average emission of chemicals per firm; = 0 
    otherwise 
Low-polluting industries = 1 if firms are in the industries with small average 
    emission of chemicals per firm; = 0 otherwise 
Export ratio (%) Ratio of export sales to the total sales 
Current debt ratio Current liabilities divided by total assets 
Age of assets Total assets divided by gross assets 
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R&D expenditures (billion yen) Annual expenditures on research and development 
Top 10 = 1 if a firm has a parent company whose quality of 
   EMS is in top 10; = 0 otherwise 
Top 11-25 =1 if a firm has a parent company whose quality of 
   EMS is in top 11-25; = 0 otherwise 
Market share (%) Firm’s sales divided by total industry sales 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index Sum of squared market share of firms in the industry
Stakeholder pressures are represented by advertising expenditures, capital intensity, 
and foreign ownership. Although firms may differ in their motivations for setting 
advertising expenditure levels, firms are likely to be well known among consumers if 
they have large advertising expenditures. Thus, advertising expenditures can be 
considered as a measure of proximity to consumers. Firms with greater advertising 
expenditures are likely to have stronger contact with consumers and therefore these 
firms may receive stronger consumer pressures to develop comprehensive EMSs.2  
Similar to Khanna and Anton (2002) and Anton et al. (2004), we use capital intensity as 
a measure of pressures from general investors. Capital intensity is defined as the value 
of fixed assets per employee. Firms with higher capital intensity are more likely to rely 
on capital markets and hence receive stronger pressures from investors to develop 
EMSs (Khanna and Anton 2002). Pressures from foreign shareholders are measured by 
foreign ownership, where foreign ownership is defined as the percentage of stocks held 
by foreign owners. Firms with higher foreign ownership may receive stronger pressures 
from foreign investors. 
Regulatory pressures are represented by industry pollution intensity and firm-level 
export ratios. Industry pollution intensity is represented by three dummy variables: 
high-polluting industries, intermediate-polluting industries, and low-polluting 
industries. These dummy variables are constructed based on the average total emissions 
per firm in each industry reported in Japan’s Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
(PRTR).3  Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) used industry dummy variables to control for 
                                                  
2 Among past studies, Nakamura et al. (2001) used advertising expenditures per sales as a measure 
of consumer goodwill. Khanna and Anton (2002) used a dummy variable indicating whether firms 
are mainly producing final goods or intermediate goods. Since many Japanese firms diversify their 
product mix and produce both final and intermediate goods, using such a dummy variable in our 
analysis is not enlightening. 
3 Like the Toxics Release Inventory of the United States, Japan’s PRTR is an inventory of emissions 
of a total of 354 potentially hazardous chemicals. We believe the average total emissions of the 
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differences in industry–wide regulatory environments. Firms operating in high-
polluting industries are likely to have higher compliance costs and greater potential for 
government sanctions. Therefore, firms in higher-polluting industries are more likely to 
develop EMSs in order to reduce current and future costs associated with government 
regulations. As explained in the previous section, firms may also receive pressures from 
foreign governments. We measure exposure to foreign government pressures by the 
export ratio, which is defined as the ratio of export sales to total sales.4 Firms with 
higher export ratios may receive stronger pressures from foreign governments.5
Ability is represented by current debt ratio, age of assets, and R&D expenditures. 
Current debt ratio is defined as current liabilities divided by total assets. It measures 
short-term financial flexibility.  Firms with higher current debt ratios may have less 
financial flexibility to make investments in EMSs. Financial ability is also affected by 
the costs of investment.  Firms with lower costs of investment are likely to have a 
higher ability to develop EMSs.  For example, firms with older equipment may find it 
less costly to replace old equipment when making a start-up investment in new 
equipment (Khanna and Anton 2002). As in Khanna and Anton (2002), the costs of 
investment are represented by age of assets. Age of assets is defined as total assets 
divided by gross assets, where gross assets are defined as total assets plus accumulated 
depreciation on tangible fixed assets. A higher value indicates newer equipment. 
Technical ability is measured by R&D expenditures. Firms with higher R&D 
expenditures are likely to have a higher stock of technical knowledge.  
The influence of a parent company on EMS comprehensiveness is represented by 
dummy variables “Top 10” and “Top 11-25.”  These variables indicate that the parent 
company is ranked among the top 10 or top 11-25 firms in terms of EMS 
comprehensiveness (see section 3.1 for our measure of comprehensiveness of EMSs). 
Market conditions are measured by market share and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. Market share is calculated by dividing sales of a firm by total industry sales. 
                                                                                                                                                  
PRTR chemicals approximate the general pollution intensity of each industry. 
4 We did not find export data by regions (Europe, North America, etc.). 
5 We are aware that export ratio may also measure factors other than foreign government pressures, 
such as pressures from consumers in foreign countries. However, we could not find a better measure 
for which data exist. 
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Larger market share indicates larger market power for a given industry.6 The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index represents market concentration. The index is calculated 
as the sum of squared market share (measured in %) of each firm in the industry. Thus, 
the index takes values between 0 and 10,000, where the maximum is attained when the 
industry is characterized by monopoly. 
For all variables constructed at the industry-level, we use the industry classification 
of the Japan Company Handbook (approximately the same as two-digit SIC codes in 
the U.S.). 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS 
3.1. Dependent variable 
This section describes how the dependent variable, which represents 
comprehensiveness of firms’ EMSs, is constructed. We obtained a dataset from the Fifth 
Environmental Survey of Japanese Manufacturers conducted by the Nikkei Newspaper.7 
The questionnaires were sent to a total of 2,040 firms, consisting of all manufacturing 
firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (these are major public firms) and a small 
number of other manufacturing firms in September 2001. The response rate was 40.2% 
(820 firms). The questionnaires had approximately 50 main questions, plus associated 
sub-questions. These questions covered eight aspects of environmental management 
practices that firms employ, such as degree of disclosure of environmental information 
about the firm, degree of establishment of monitoring and audit systems of pollutants 
that are generated through production processes, extent of employee training, 
comprehensiveness of firm’s recycling practices, and so on. After the questionnaires 
were collected, the answers were summed for each practice, producing what the Nikkei 
Newspaper called a “score” for each environmental practice by individual firms. Since 
the numbers of associated questions were slightly different across practices, the Nikkei 
Newspaper standardized the scores so that the mean becomes 50 and the standard 
                                                  
6 Strictly speaking, the Lerner Index is the theoretically valid measure of market power. In practice, 
however, market share is widely used, including in antitrust cases, because obtaining the necessary 
data to calculate the Lerner Index is difficult (Goldberg and Knetter 1999). 
7 The Nikkei Newspaper is Japan’s equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. Although the Nikkei 
Newspaper has the copyright of the survey results, the survey itself was designed and conducted in 
cooperation with the Nikkei Research. The Nikkei Research is a well-known research institute in 
Japan specializing in corporate research, marketing research, and database development. 
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deviation becomes 10. The dataset we obtained consists of standardized scores of each 
of the eight environmental practices at the individual firm level. The description of 
these eight practices is summarized in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Eight Categories of Environmental Management Practices 
 
Variable 
name 
Description 
v1 Degree of introduction of management systems related to ISO14000 series 
v2 Degree of environmental information disclosed and ease of access to the disclosed 
information by the public 
v3 Extent of employee training and environmental consideration in human resource 
management (such as whether there are incentive programs to promote 
environmental awareness among employees) 
v4 Whether firms have various long-term environmental management plans 
v5 Degree of monitoring and audit systems of pollutants that are generated through 
production processes 
v6 Comprehensiveness of recycling practices 
v7 Degree of monitoring of green-house gas emissions and energy use in production 
processes 
v8 Comprehensiveness of life cycle assessment, or assessment of environmental 
impacts of firm’s products at various stages of their production and consumption 
Note: This table is constructed based on Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2002). 
 
The survey results reflect comprehensiveness of each firm’s EMS in a sense that 
the eight environmental practices represent different aspects of firm’s EMS, therefore 
reflecting breadth of the EMS. Furthermore, rather than simple binary information on 
whether or not firms adopt each environmental practice, the survey results contain 
richer information on intensity of each of the environmental practices firms employ 
because there were several questions associated with each of the practices. As an 
objective measure of the comprehensiveness of the EMS for each firm, we use the 
principal component score that is obtained from applying a principal component 
analysis (PCA) to the dataset.8 Principal component analysis is a commonly used 
                                                  
8 The Nikkei Newspaper also applied PCA and a portion of the results were published in a report 
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statistical technique used to reduce the dimensionality of possibly correlated variables 
without losing much of the information contained in the original data set. 
Mathematically, PCA determines the optimal weights  for linear combinations 
of the p original variables  (j = 1, 2, …, p). In our dataset,  correspond to 
scores for the eight environmental practices and p = 8. The first principal component 
captures the largest proportion of data variation, and the second principal component 
captures the second largest variation subject to the constraint that the second principal 
component is orthogonal to the first principal component. Therefore, different principal 
components capture independent dimensions of the data. As is standard, we normalized 
 such that the mean becomes 0 and the standard deviation becomes 1, and then 
applied PCA in order to produce robust results. 
ikw
s'jv s'jv
jv
The results of PCA are shown in table 3.9 The eigenvalue associated with the kth 
principal component represents the proportion of the variance of the original variables 
explained by the kth principal component. The proportion of the variance explained, 
labeled as contribution ratio, is calculated as each eigenvalue divided by 8 
(mathematically the sum of all eight eigenvalues must equal to 8). As is shown, the first 
principal component explains over 78% of the variance, while the second principal 
component explains only 4.9%. Thus, the first principal component captures most of the 
information contained in the original 8 variables and thus can reasonably be considered 
as a measure of the comprehensiveness of firms’ EMSs (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2002). 
Larger values of the first principal component score indicate that the firm has a more 
comprehensive EMS. Let  be the degree of the comprehensiveness of the iiS
th firm’s 
EMS as measured by the first principal component score. Larger value indicates more 
comprehensive EMSs. We treat  as a continuous variable because it takes sufficiently 
many values.
iS
10  
                                                                                                                                                  
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2002). We conducted PCA by ourselves to investigate the validity of the 
measure of comprehensiveness in details. Although the dependent variable is based on the results of 
PCA conducted by ourselves, similar figures (the first principal component scores) are available in 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2002). 
9 The first two principal components are also shown in Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2002). Although 
there are slight differences, our results are consistent with their results. 
10 Principal component scores take different values for each firm. For all 820 samples, the score 
ranges from -3.79 to 6.73, with median -0.40. The score is not truncated from below because all 
firms have at least some environmental practices and therefore we do not use a Tobit model. 
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Table 3: Results of Principal Component Analysis 
Weight coefficients First principal 
component 
Second principal 
component 
Third principal 
component 
w1 0.361 0.111             -0.412 
w2 0.358 0.283             -0.391 
w3 0.338 0.385 0.746 
w4 0.358 0.018 0.031 
w5 0.361  -0.401             -0.112 
w6 0.344  -0.537 0.314 
w7 0.362  -0.303             -0.063 
w8 0.346 0.468             -0.056 
Eigenvalue 6.267 0.392            0.328 
Contribution ratio (%)a             78.33           4.90            4.09 
Note. aContribution ratio represents the proportion of the variance explained, and is calculated as 
each eigenvalue divided by 8. 
3.2. Estimation methods 
In this section, we explain the empirical methods used to evaluate the determinants of 
the comprehensiveness of EMSs developed by firms. In the previous section, we 
hypothesized that the comprehensiveness of a firm’s EMS is determined by various firm 
characteristics. This relationship is represented by: 
ii uS += βXi , 
 [1] 
where  is a vector of variables that are hypothesized to affect EMS 
comprehensiveness, and  is an error term. Some of the firm characteristics might be 
endogenously (contemporaneously) affected by the comprehensiveness of EMS. In 
order to avoid endogeneity, firm characteristics are measured with a three-year lag.  
Thus, a vector of firm characteristics  is measured in 1998.
iX
iu
iX
11
The dependent variable is constructed from survey results, and thus is observed 
only for those firms that responded to the survey.  This raises an econometric issue in 
the estimation of equation [1] because the non-response may be based on self-selection 
                                                  
11 We find that our conclusions are largely unaffected by the choice of a three-year lag (versus, say, a 
five-year lag). 
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rather than random sampling. It is possible that the firms’ decision to respond to the 
survey was dependent on the expected score the firm would receive. For example, firms 
with potentially lower scores are less likely to respond to the survey because a low 
score may lead to bad publicity.12 Thus, the estimation of equation [1] by OLS may lead 
to biased coefficient estimates. Although self-selection by non-response is always an 
issue in surveys, controlling for it in the analysis is difficult because independent 
variables associated with non-respondents are not often available. In our dataset, we 
know to whom surveys were sent (all manufacturing firms listed in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange) and the firm characteristics data are available from published data sources 
for both respondents and non-respondents. 
By taking advantage of this feature, we address the self-selection problem using 
full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). FIML produces an 
asymptotically efficient estimator. Let  be a binary variable representing whether or 
not a firm has responded to the survey, where 
iD
1=iD  if a firm has responded and 
 if it has not responded.  Therefore,  is observed only when .  Firms are 
assumed to respond to the survey only if doing so will give them higher profits.  In 
order to model the decision to respond to the survey, we introduce a latent variable . 
 represents the i
0=iD iS 1=iD
*
iD
*
iD
th firm’s incentive to respond to the survey such that  if 
 and  if . We model the decision as: 
1=iD
0≥*iD 0=iD 0<*iD
 .    [2] i
*
i vD += γZi
The vector  contains all the variables in  (measured in 1998) because the decision 
to respond is likely to depend on the expected score , which in turn is hypothesized t
be affected by iX iZ so contains sales measured in 2001, which is not in iX
variable serves as an exclusion restriction, although the model is identified through 
assumptions on the error terms even without such a restriction. The variable is included 
because the response rate is likely to be positively correlated with firm size. If a firm 
has a high-quality EMS, it is likely to respond to the survey regardless of firm size. If, 
however, a firm does not have a comprehensive EMS, it will likely to respond only if it 
is large. The rationale is that if large firms did not respond, people are likely to notice 
iZ iX
iS o 
.  al . This 
                                                 
 
 
12 Firms do not need to know the exact scores they would receive in order for this conjecture to be 
plausible. Firms only need to know whether their EMSs are generally comprehensive or not. 
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and assume that the firms did not respond because they have low-quality EMSs. In 
contrast, people may not notice that small firms did not respond to the survey. 
We make a standard assumption that  and  are jointly normally distributed 
with mean zero and covariance matrix .   is normalized to be 1 for 
identification purpose because we observe only the sign of . Both equations [1] and 
[2] are simultaneously estimated using full information maximum likelihood estimation. 
FIML incorporates information on the correlation of error terms in equations [1] and [2] 
and produces an asymptotically efficient estimator. The log-likelihood function to be 
maximized is given by (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) 
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where  and Φ  are the density and the cdf of the standard normal distribution 
respectively. 
φ
3.3. Data 
The independent variables, , are taken from published data books. All firm 
characteristics are taken from the Japan Company Handbook with the following 
exceptions. Advertising expenditures are taken from Ad Spending of Leading Japanese 
Corporations. Age of assets is calculated using data on accumulated depreciation from 
Nikkei Annual Corporation Reports.  The dummy variables for pollution intensity are 
constructed based on the average emissions per firm in each industry reported in 
Japan’s PRTR.
iX
13
The initial sample consisted of the 2,040 firms to which the questionnaires were 
sent.  Of these, we excluded firms not listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange because data 
on these firms are very limited. This first exclusion resulted in 1,575 firms.  After 
                                                  
13 These dummy variables are constructed based on emissions data during 2001 because prior years 
are not available (Japan’s PRTR started in 2001). We thus implicitly assume that industry pollution 
intensities do not change over a short period. 
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selecting only the firms with complete data, we had the sample size of 1,154.  We used 
these 1,154 firms to estimate equations [1] and [2]. Of these 1,154 firms, 536 firms 
responded to the survey and therefore have principal component scores.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable All firms Respondents Non-respondents 
Principal component score  0.360 
(2.410) 
 
Advertising expenditures 
(billion yen) 
1.453 
 (5.452)a
2.695 
(7.667) 
0.376 
(1.441) 
Capital intensity 0.032 
(0.049) 
0.033 
(0.027) 
0.031 
(0.061) 
Foreign ownership (%) 5.064 
(7.829) 
7.46 
(9.30) 
2.98 
(5.49) 
Heavily-polluting industries 0.290 
(0.454) 
0.295 
(0.456) 
0.286 
(0.452) 
Intermediate-polluting 
industries 
0.491 
(0.500) 
0.481 
(0.500) 
0.500 
(0.500) 
Low-polluting industries 0.218 
(0.413) 
0.224 
(0.417) 
0.214 
(0.410) 
Export ratio (%) 13.34 
(18.29) 
16.45 
(19.47) 
10.64 
(16.76) 
Current debt ratio 0.392 
(0.185) 
0.371 
(0.171) 
0.411 
(0.195) 
Age of assets 0.746 
(0.130) 
0.736 
(0.127) 
0.754 
(0.133) 
R&D expenditures (billion 
yen) 
7.22 
(33.69) 
14.47 
(48.41) 
0.94 
(2.08) 
Top 10 0.022 
(0.146) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
0.0049 
(0.070) 
Top 11-25 0.025 
(0.157) 
0.028 
(0.165) 
0.023 
(0.149) 
Market share (%) 1.14 
(2.58) 
1.94 
(3.53) 
0.449 
(0.792) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
526.63 
(307.39) 
527.45 
(323.09) 
525.92 
(293.34) 
Sales (billion yen, 2001) 221.94 
(770.94) 
418.65 
(1,097.08) 
51.34 
(65.43) 
    
N 1,154 536 618 
Note. All variables are measured in 1998 unless specified. 
 aStandard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for all firms (all 1,154 firms used for the 
estimation of equations [1] and [2]), for firms that responded to the survey, and for 
firms that did not respond to the survey.  For some variables, the means of respondents 
and non-respondents differ substantially. For example, mean R&D expenditures for 
respondents and non-respondents are 14.47 billion yen and 0.94 billion yen 
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respectively. Similarly, mean advertising expenditures and sales for respondents are 
much larger than those for non-respondents. Such differences suggest that self-selection 
may exist due to both observable and unobservable factors. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Results 
This section presents our results and discusses their policy implications. Table 5 
summarizes the underlying hypotheses, expected signs of explanatory variables, and 
empirical results. We estimated equation [1] using both OLS and FIML and the results 
are shown in table 6.  The null hypothesis that 0=ρ  is rejected at the 1% level, 
indicating that self-selection is statistically significant. We can see how self-selection 
bias affects OLS estimates in table 6. Generally speaking, OLS estimates tend to be 
larger in magnitude and statistically more significant. For example, the coefficients on 
R&D expenditures and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are strongly significant under 
OLS, but are insignificant under FIML. All other coefficients have smaller magnitudes 
under FIML as well with the exception of the dummy variables for pollution intensities, 
which represent regulatory pressures. Pollution intensities become larger in magnitude 
and statistically more significant under FIML. These observations are consistent with 
our original claim: Using information only on respondents tends to overstate the impact 
and significance of the independent variables because firms with more comprehensive 
EMSs are more likely to respond to the survey and these firms have characteristics that 
are associated with more comprehensive EMSs.  
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Table 5: Summary of the Hypotheses and Results 
 
Hypotheses (Factors 
expected to affect 
development of 
EMSs) 
Variable Expected sign 
Results 
from 
OLS 
Results 
from 
FIML 
Joint 
significance 
under FIML, 
 [J]2χ
{p-value}d
1. Stakeholder 
pressures 
 
Advertising expenditures 
Capital intensity 
Foreign ownership 
+a
+ 
+ 
+ 
N.S.b
+ 
+ 
N.S. 
+ 
8.75 
{0.0328} 
2. Regulatory 
pressures 
 
Heavily-polluting industries 
Intermediate-polluting industries 
Export ratio 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
N.S. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
19.91 
{0.0002} 
3. Ability 
 
 
Current debt ratio 
Age of assets 
R&D expenditures 
- 
- 
+ 
N.S. 
- 
+ 
N.S. 
- 
N.S. 
8.28 
{0.0406} 
4. Parent company’s 
influence 
Top 10 
Top 11-25 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
20.39 
{0.0000} 
5. Market 
conditions 
Market share 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
+ 
?c
+ 
- 
+ 
N.S. 
6.52 
{0.0384} 
 
Note. aThe positive and negative signs indicate the direction of the impact of independent variables 
on dependent variable. 
bN.S. stands for not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
c“?” means the direction is ambiguous. 
dJoint significance is a Wald test for slope coefficients jointly equal to zero. The degrees of freedom 
(J) is either 2 or 3, depending on the number of variables associated with the hypothesis. 
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Table 6: Estimates of Motivations behind Development of EMSs 
 Independent variables OLS FIML 
  Constant 1.850 
    (0.733)** 
1.701 
  (0.729)** 
1. Stakeholder pressures   
    Advertising expenditures 0.0415 
     (0.0159)*** 
0.0394 
    (0.0174)** 
    Capital intensity 1.338 
(3.352) 
0.205 
(3.291) 
    Foreign ownership 0.0450 
    (0.0103)*** 
0.0195 
 (0.0109)* 
2. Regulatory pressures   
    Heavily-polluting industries 0.600 
    (0.274)** 
0.956 
     (0.276)*** 
    Intermediate-polluting industries 0.251 
(0.239) 
0.606 
    (0.241)** 
    Export ratio 0.0192 
     (0.00455)*** 
0.0117 
   (0.00467)** 
3. Ability   
    Current debt ratio -0.389 
(0.530) 
-0.258 
(0.521) 
    Age of assets -3.332 
      (0.794)*** 
-1.837 
     (0.788)** 
    R&D expenditures 0.00538 
   (0.00257)** 
0.00443 
(0.00283) 
4. Parent company’s influence   
    Top 10 2.729 
     (0.425)*** 
1.899 
     (0.459)*** 
    Top 11-25 1.127 
   (0.496)** 
0.986 
  (0.502)* 
5. Market conditions   
    Market share 0.167 
     (0.0309)*** 
0.0856 
   (0.0338)** 
    Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.00103 
      (0.000298)*** 
-0.000393 
(0.000303) 
   
Selection equation (equation [2])   
    Constant  0.172 
(0.350) 
    Advertising expenditures  -0.0178 
(0.0224) 
    Capital intensity  -1.491 
(1.517) 
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    Foreign ownership  0.0000917 
(0.00656) 
    Heavily-polluting industries  -0.133 
(0.137) 
    Intermediate-polluting industries  0.0158 
(0.121) 
    Export ratio  0.000245 
(0.00251) 
    Current debt ratio  -0.606 
   (0.247)** 
    Age of assets  -0.928 
   (0.371)** 
    R&D expenditures  0.0826 
    (0.0187)*** 
    Top 10  0.582 
 (0.321)* 
    Top 11-25  0.0622 
(0.259) 
    Market share  0.0588 
(0.0517) 
    Herfindahl-Hirschman index  -0.0000514 
(0.000161) 
    Sales  0.00505 
     (0.000696)*** 
   
Number of observations 536 Respondents = 536 Non-respondents = 618 
ρ (standard error) {p-value}a  -0.818 (0.029) {0.000} 
Adjusted R2 0.390  
Log likelihood  -1627.01 
F[13,522]{p-value}b 27.33{0.000}  
]13[2χ {p-value}c  146.67{0.000} 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the first principal component score. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Low-polluting industries are the excluded industries. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
aρ is the correlation coefficient between  and . P-value shown in curly brackets is iu iv
the probability that ρ = 0. 
 bF[13,522] is an F-test for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero. 
 c ]13[2χ  is a Wald test for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.
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The estimates by FIML are consistent with the expected signs and generally support 
the hypotheses. The far-right column of table 5 shows the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the independent variables associated with each hypothesis. For all 
hypotheses, the coefficients are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level. Regulatory 
pressures and parent company’s influence are particularly highly statistically significant. 
The hypothesis that firms with stronger stakeholder pressures develop more 
comprehensive EMSs is partially supported.  Firms with larger advertising expenditures 
and thus in stronger contact with consumers are likely to develop more comprehensive 
EMSs.  Firms that receive stronger pressures from foreign investors, as measured by a 
higher percentage of foreign ownership, are also likely to develop more comprehensive 
EMSs. However, there is no evidence that stronger pressures from the general investor 
population, as measured by larger capital intensity, lead to more comprehensive EMSs. 
 The hypothesis that stronger regulatory pressures motivate firms to develop more 
comprehensive EMSs is strongly supported. Firms operating in high-polluting industries 
are likely to develop more comprehensive EMSs. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on high-polluting industries is larger than that of intermediate-polluting 
industries. This result is consistent with our hypothesis: firms operating in high-polluting 
industries are likely to receive stronger regulatory pressures than those in intermediate-
polluting industries.  Regulatory pressures from foreign governments, as measured by the 
export ratio, also have a significantly positive effect on the comprehensiveness of 
EMSs.14
 The hypothesis that firms with higher technical and financial abilities are likely to 
develop more comprehensive EMSs is weakly supported. The effect of financial 
constraints as measured by a higher current debt ratio is, as expected, negative, but is not 
statistically significant. Technical knowledge as measured by R&D expenditures is not 
statistically significant either, after controlling for self-selection (the R&D coefficient in 
the selection equation implies that firms with larger R&D expenditures were more likely 
 
14 As we mentioned in the previous section, export ratio may also measure factors other than foreign 
government pressures, such as pressures from consumers in foreign countries. We are aware of this 
limitation, and we leave it as future research to investigate the effect of various pressures from foreign 
countries. 
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to respond to the survey). While financial flexibility and technical knowledge are 
statistically insignificant, investment costs do have a significant effect. Firms with newer 
facilities, and thus with higher costs of replacing the existing assets, have significantly 
less comprehensive EMSs. 
The hypothesis that a parent company influences the comprehensiveness of the 
subsidiary company’s EMS is strongly supported.  Firms that have parent companies in 
the top 10 in terms of the comprehensiveness of EMSs are likely to develop more 
comprehensive EMSs. The coefficient of “Top 11-25” is also positive and significant, but 
the magnitude is smaller than that of Top 10. Therefore, the influence of parent company 
is larger if the parent company’s EMS is more comprehensive. 
 The hypothesis that market conditions affect firms’ EMSs is partially supported. 
Firms with larger market share and thus with larger market power have significantly more 
comprehensive EMSs. Firms with a larger Herfindahl-Hirschman index, implying that are 
operating in more concentrated industries, are significantly less likely to develop 
comprehensive EMSs under OLS. After controlling for self-selection, however, the effect 
is not statistically significant. 
4.2. Comparisons with previous studies 
Our broad findings generally support previous findings (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; 
Dasgupta et al. 2000; Nakamura et al. 2001; Welch et al. 2002; Khanna and Anton 2002; 
Anton et al. 2004). For example, these studies also found regulatory pressures to be 
significant in explaining firms’ voluntary adoption of environmental practices. In 
addition, the effects of stakeholders, such as consumers, are generally found to be 
significant (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Khanna and Anton 
2002; Anton et al. 2004). However, there are several important differences. 
First, previous studies on firm adoption of environmental practices (Henriques and 
Sadorsky 1996; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Nakamura et al. 2001; Welch et al. 2002; Khanna 
and Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004) used survey data but did not control for self-selection. 
We found that after controlling for self-selection, the effects of regulatory pressures tend 
to become more significant and larger in magnitude while the effects of other variables 
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tend to become less significant and smaller in magnitude. This finding does not alter the 
previous findings that regulatory pressures are important, but rather our finding reinforces 
the importance of regulatory pressures because previous studies may have underestimated 
the significance and magnitude of regulatory pressures. 
Second, our results indicate the factors that motivate EMS comprehensiveness by 
Japanese firms may not be exactly the same as those motivating firms in other countries, 
especially in U.S. and Canada. For example, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) and Khanna 
and Anton (2002) found that pressures from general shareholders are important in 
motivating firms to take proactive actions in U.S. and Canada. We found that firms that 
receive stronger pressures from foreign investors, as measured by a higher percentage of 
foreign ownership, are likely to develop more comprehensive EMSs. However, there is 
no evidence that stronger pressures from the general investor population, as measured by 
larger capital intensity, lead to more comprehensive EMSs. This result might indicate that 
Japanese investors are not as concerned with the environmental performance of firms as 
foreign investors are (alternatively, firms may not receive stronger pressures from 
Japanese investors compared to foreign investors). We also found that R&D expenditures 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman index become insignificant when self-selection is controlled 
for, implying that technical knowledge and the market structure may not be major factors 
that affect EMS development among Japanese firms. Khanna and Anton (2002) found 
both of these factors statistically significant in firm adoption of environmental practices 
in the United States, but our results do not support their finding after controlling for self-
selection. We cannot conclude whether these findings are due to the methodological 
differences (self-selection) or the true differences in the behaviors of Japanese firms and 
firms in other countries, but our results indicate more careful studies are needed in order 
to accurately quantify the relative importance of various motivations. 
Third, there are some important differences between our results and those of 
previous studies on Japanese firms. For example, Nakamura et al. (2001) found that R&D 
expenditures negatively affect adoption of ISO 14001 among Japanese firms (meaning 
firms with large R&D expenditures are less likely to adopt ISO 14001), but we found the 
effect of R&D expenditures positive and significant under OLS and insignificant under 
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FIML. In addition, consumers pressures were found to explain only some aspects of ISO 
14001 adoption among Japanese firms (Nakamura et al. 2001; Welch et al. 2002), but our 
results suggest that Japanese firms do receive strong pressures from consumers to be 
environmentally proactive. Furthermore, contrary to Nakamura et al. (2001), we found 
financial health does not affect EMS development. 
4.3. Policy implications 
In order to assess policy implications of the results, we examine how comprehensiveness 
of firms’ EMSs changes when firm characteristics are changed. Table 7 calculates the 
changes in the principal component score (our dependent variable) when the independent 
variables that are statistically significant under FIML are changed from their minimum 
values to their maximum values. The result is shown in the column labeled “Changes in 
predicted score”.15  We can see that consumer pressures as measured by advertising 
expenditures have the largest impact, and market power as measured by market share has 
the second largest impact. Regulatory pressures, as measured by the industry’s pollution 
intensity and the firm’s export ratio, also have large combined effects. In the far right 
column, we calculate how changes in the predicted principal component score translate 
into changes in the relative position of the firms’ comprehensiveness of EMSs. These 
figures are derived by first adding the predicted change in the principal component score 
to the principal component score at the median (50th percentile) and then finding the 
percentile that corresponds to this score. A change in the percentile is then calculated by 
subtracting 50 from this percentile. Thus, these figures represent changes in the relative 
position from the median when one of the independent variables is changed holding 
others fixed. As can be seen, changes in the percentiles are generally quite large. 
Advertising expenditures have a potential to change comprehensiveness of a firm’s EMS 
by nearly 40%. These observations have several policy implications.  
 
15 We chose to change independent variables from minimum to maximum rather than for one standard 
deviation (or two standard deviations) because changing dummy variables for a fraction does not 
make sense. Changing dummy variables from 0 to 1 while changing all other variables for one 
standard deviation may not be a good strategy either in this context because it makes the impact of 
these variables difficult to compare with each other. 
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Table 7: Economic Significance of Independent Variables 
 
Variable Coefficients MinimumMaximum Changes in predicted scorea
Changes in 
percentilesb
Advertising expenditures 0.0394 0.001 99.5 3.919 39.1 
Foreign ownership 0.0195 0 77.9 1.519 17.2 
Heavily-polluting industries 0.956 0 1 0.956 11.8 
Intermediate-polluting 
industries 0.606 0 1 0.606 8.3 
Export ratio 0.0117 0 99 1.157 13.4 
Age of assets -1.837 0.32 0.99 -1.231 -18.0 
Top 10 1.899 0 1 1.899 21.1 
Top 11-25 0.986 0 1 0.986 12.1 
Market share 0.0856 0.0004 36.5 3.098 31.2 
 
Note. aChanges in predicted principal component score are calculated by changing each variable from 
minimum to maximum holding other variables fixed. 
bChanges in percentiles are derived by first adding the predicted change in the principal 
component score to the principal component score at the median (50th percentile) and then finding 
the percentile that corresponds to this score. A change in the percentile is then calculated by 
subtracting 50 from this percentile. 
 
First, because consumer pressures have the largest impact, policy makers can 
encourage firms to develop more comprehensive EMSs by increasing public awareness. 
The Japanese government has started to disclose firms’ emissions of PRTR chemicals 
(the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, which is similar to the Toxics Release 
Inventory of the United States) since 2003, and this is one policy tool that can increase 
availability of information to consumers. 
Second, regulators can use these empirical results to target future incentive programs 
aimed at encouraging EMS development.  We identified firm characteristics that are 
likely to lead to comprehensive EMSs.  Lack of these characteristics may deter firms’ 
development of EMSs. Therefore, policy makers can target firms that lack these 
characteristics and provide assistance through incentive programs. For example, public 
recognition seems an effective tool since consumer pressures have the largest impact. A 
subsidy on EMS-related investment may work as well since investment costs were found 
significant. On the other hand, technical assistance may not be effective because technical 
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knowledge was found insignificant. 
Third, despite the seemingly “voluntary” nature of EMS development, regulations 
play an important role in motivating firms to develop comprehensive EMSs. They can 
play such a role directly, as proxied by the industry’s pollution intensity, or indirectly by 
allowing other stakeholders to pressure firms to develop EMSs. For example, we found 
that consumer pressures have a substantial effect on inducing firms to develop 
comprehensive EMSs. The effectiveness of consumer pressures, however, hinges on the 
availability of accurate information on firms’ environmental performance, and accurate 
and reliable information disclosure typically requires regulatory tools such as Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Registers. Therefore, although encouraging the development of 
comprehensive EMSs has the potential to augment existing regulations, regulatory tools 
are fundamental to the success of these voluntary approaches. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we investigated the factors that motivate firms to develop comprehensive 
environmental management systems. Our broad findings generally support the previous 
analyses (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Nakamura et al. 2001; 
Welch et al. 2002; Khanna and Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004). For example, we found 
regulatory pressures are important as previous studies empirically found. In addition, the 
effects of stakeholders such as consumers are found to be significant as was generally 
supported in previous analyses (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Dasgupta et al. 2000; 
Khanna and Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004). We found that after controlling for self-
selection in survey response, the effect of regulatory pressures tend to become more 
significant and larger in magnitude, while the effect of other variables tend to become 
less significant and smaller in magnitude. For example, we found that R&D expenditures 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman index are insignificant when self-selection is controlled for, 
implying that technical knowledge and the market structure may not be major factors that 
affect EMS development. We also found that consumer pressures, regulatory pressures, 
and market power are most important in determining the comprehensiveness of a firm’s 
EMS. 
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We believe our results are important not because we found a few results that differ 
from previous analyses (such as the effects of market conditions, technical knowledge, 
and financial health), but because our results reinforce the importance of regulatory and 
stakeholder pressures. Despite using different data, controlling for self-selection bias, and 
considering the comprehensiveness of EMSs rather than the adoption of a single 
environmental practice, our results affirm the importance of regulatory and stakeholder 
pressures. This consistency provides an important foundation for turning academic 
research into effective policy implementations. 
Our results suggest that Georgia’s efforts to encourage firms to develop EMSs, if 
well targeted, have the potential to augment existing regulatory tools. At the same time, 
regulations are important not only for directly motivating firms to develop EMSs but for 
indirectly allowing other stakeholders to pressure firms to develop EMSs. For example, 
we found that consumer pressures have a substantial effect on inducing firms to develop 
comprehensive EMSs. The effectiveness of consumer pressures, however, hinges on the 
availability of accurate information on firms’ environmental performance, and accurate 
and reliable information disclosure typically requires regulatory tools such as Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Registers (e.g., the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory). 
Thus, although we believe our empirical results suggest that an official policy of 
encouraging development of EMSs has the potential to augment existing regulations, 
regulatory tools are fundamental to the success of such voluntary approaches. 
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